Security Analysis of Ekert-type QKD Protocol Coming Under Cloning Attacks

We analyze the security of an Ekert type bipartite key distribution protocol coming under cloning attacks by an untrusted observer. Precisely, an eavesdropper is assumed to intercept and apply an asymmetric, phase-variant cloner on one or both qubits which are transmitted over public channel from an authenticated source to the trusted parties. We partially characterize two-qubit states from the perspective of designing a QKD protocol that can generate a distillable secret key among the trusted users even under such cloning attacks. We rely upon Devetak Winter framework for computing key rate so as to identify states, which when used in the protocol, secret-key can be distilled. Utility of an entangled state, for designing a successful QKD protocol, changes from single-qubit to double-qubits cloning attacks. Interestingly, we can distinguish some useful families of two-qubit entangled states when only one of the transmitted qubits is cloned by a malicious third party.

Source: arXiv:2610.37337v1 - http://arxiv.org/abs/2610.37337v1 PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2610.37337v1 Original Link: http://arxiv.org/abs/2610.37337v1