The Myth of Restrictive Working-Time Agreements: Firms' Working-Time Adjustment after Exit from Collective Bargaining
Abstract
Employers in Germany argue that collective agreements restrict their flexibility concerning working hours. Using data from the IAB Establishment Panel for the years 2008 to 2024, we investigate working-time adjustments after exit from collective bargaining. We find that exit is associated with only a modest increase in weekly working hours of around 0.3 to 0.6 per cent using fixed-effects and event-study models, corresponding to eight to thirteen additional minutes per week. This adjustment occu...
Description / Details
Employers in Germany argue that collective agreements restrict their flexibility concerning working hours. Using data from the IAB Establishment Panel for the years 2008 to 2024, we investigate working-time adjustments after exit from collective bargaining. We find that exit is associated with only a modest increase in weekly working hours of around 0.3 to 0.6 per cent using fixed-effects and event-study models, corresponding to eight to thirteen additional minutes per week. This adjustment occurs shortly after leaving collective bargaining coverage. We further find no evidence that other margins of working-time adjustment, such as Saturday or Sunday work, are used more extensively after exit. In contrast to previous survey evidence, our findings call into question that working-hours constraints are one of the main drivers of exit from collective bargaining coverage.
Source: arXiv:2610.12049v1 - http://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12049v1 PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2610.12049v1 Original Link: http://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12049v1
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Oct 9, 2026
Environmental Science
Economics
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