Trust Without Boundaries: An Architectural Analysis of Satellite Flight Software

As spacecraft become more software-driven and interconnected, onboard flight software is an increasingly important security boundary. Popular flight software architectures often treat onboard components as trusted peers, simplifying integration while limiting internal isolation and access control. We analyze NASA's Core Flight Software (cFS) to examine how authority, identity, communication, observability, and persistence are distributed across onboard components. Using NASA's flight-representative NOS3 simulator, we validate these weaknesses through five experiments implemented with a malicious onboard component that abuses legitimate architectural privileges. We then compare cFS with other modular flight software frameworks to identify recurring trust assumptions and architectural weaknesses. Our results show that a single compromised component can exploit broadly shared authority in ways that are difficult to distinguish from legitimate behavior. We conclude with architectural implications and discuss mechanisms for strengthening internal trust boundaries in future flight software systems.

Source: arXiv:2608.14532v1 - http://arxiv.org/abs/2608.14532v1 PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.14532v1 Original Link: http://arxiv.org/abs/2608.14532v1