Competitive mediator games and urban CAV routing markets

Inspired by possible future markets of autonomous routing and driving (ARAD), we introduce competitive mediator games and their equilibria which generalize the (coarse) correlated equilibria, which have become a popular research area recently as they not only can be more socially efficient than Nash equilibria but also are limits of algorithmic no-regret multi-agent learning dynamics. We discuss the basic properties of competitive mediator games and prove that in the generic setting of anonymous congestion(routing) games with market-share maximizing mediators all competitive mediator equilibria are monopolies whenever one of the mediators is weakly preferred to other mediators by all users. We apply and interpret these results in the context of new markets of competing ARAD service providers. We also provide a comprehensive overview of these markets and discuss the future mechanism design thereof.

Source: arXiv:2608.09894v1 - http://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09894v1 PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.09894v1 Original Link: http://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09894v1