Drawing the LINE: Cryptographic Analysis and Security Improvements for the LINE E2EE Protocol
Abstract
LINE has emerged as one of the most popular communication platforms in many East Asian countries, including Thailand and Japan, with millions of active users. Therefore, it is essential to understand its security guarantees. In this work, we present the first provable security analysis of the LINE version two (LINEv2) messaging protocol, focusing on its cryptographic guarantees in a real-world setting. We capture the architecture and security of the LINE messaging protocol by modifying the Multi-Stage Key Exchange (MSKE) model, a framework for analysing cryptographic protocols under adversarial conditions. While LINEv2 achieves basic security properties such as key indistinguishability and message authentication, we highlight the lack of forward secrecy (FS) and post-compromise security (PCS). To address this, we introduce a stronger version of the LINE protocol, introducing FS and PCS to LINE, analysing and benchmarking our results.
Source: arXiv:2602.18370v1 - http://arxiv.org/abs/2602.18370v1 PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2602.18370v1 Original Link: http://arxiv.org/abs/2602.18370v1