Forecasting and Manipulating the Forecasts of Others

In strategic environments with private information, evaluating a change in policy requires predicting how the equilibrium responds -- but when actions reshape opponents' signals, each agent's optimal response depends on an infinite hierarchy of beliefs about beliefs that has resisted exact analysis for four decades. We provide the first exact equilibrium characterization of finite-player continuous-time LQG games with endogenous signals. Conditioning on primitive Brownian shocks rather than the physical state -- a dynamic analogue of Harsanyi's common-prior construction -- collapses the belief hierarchy onto deterministic two-time kernels, reducing Nash equilibrium to a deterministic fixed point with no truncation and no large-population limit. The characterization yields an explicit information wedge $\mathcal{V}^i_t$ -- a deterministic Volterra process -- that prices the marginal value of shifting opponents' posteriors. The wedge vanishes precisely when signals are exogenous to controls, formally delineating the boundary where strategic belief manipulation matters, and provides a closed-form mapping from information primitives to equilibrium outcomes.

Source: arXiv:2603.12140v1 - http://arxiv.org/abs/2603.12140v1 PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2603.12140v1 Original Link: http://arxiv.org/abs/2603.12140v1