Microfinance Competition in the Presence of Moneylenders: Theory and Evidence

After decades of microfinance expansion and despite charging higher interest rates, moneylenders continue to exist alongside microfinance institutions (MFIs). We develop a dynamic model with ex post moral hazard, in which borrowers use MFI loans for production and can rely on moneylenders for bridge loans after shocks to repay MFIs and preserve future access to MFI credit. We then study how MFI competition shapes the coexistence between MFIs and moneylenders. The effect of competition on MFI credit is ambiguous: it may weaken repayment incentives or replace moneylenders as bridge lenders. By contrast, competition unambiguously reduces moneylender credit. In a village-level randomized expansion in Bangladesh, stratified by baseline MFI presence, one additional MFI reduces the number of moneylender loans by roughly 30-40% two to three years later, with no detectable effect on MFI or overall borrowing. This suggests that, in markets where MFIs rely primarily on the threat of exclusion to induce repayment and moneylenders provide emergency finance, gains from additional MFI entry may be greater in less saturated areas.

Source: arXiv:2610.12186v1 - http://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12186v1 PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2610.12186v1 Original Link: http://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12186v1