EFI Pairs Without One-Way Puzzles: Oracle Separations from Communication Complexity

EFI pairs (Brakerski, Canetti, and Qian, ITCS 2023) and one-way puzzles (Khurana and Tomer, STOC 2024) are the leading candidates for the minimal assumption of quantum cryptography. The first are efficiently preparable quantum states, statistically far yet computationally indistinguishable; the second are classical puzzles, easy to sample and hard to solve. One-way puzzles imply EFI pairs, and whether the converse holds is open. We construct a single classical oracle relative to which one-way puzzles do not exist, even with an unbounded verifier, while an EFI pair survives every distinguisher that queries the oracle classically throughout and holds advice about it, making its one superposition query at the end. The oracle answers every question about the output probabilities of quantum samplers, which removes the puzzles, and hides a Haar-random half-dimensional subspace. To prove security we reduce it to communication complexity. An adversary whose knowledge of the subspace arrives as classical query answers can be simulated inside a two-party protocol against the party holding it, so it does no better than the best classical protocol for Vector-in-Subspace (Klartag and Regev, STOC 2011), whatever the oracle computes. That argument does not cover the superposition query, which we bound instead using tools from random matrix theory. The same attack gives a classical simulation of any quantum party in a classical-message protocol with no entanglement shared in advance, so relative to the oracle there is no proof of quantumness either. Quantum polynomial time therefore offers no advantage on any task with classical inputs and outputs, while the two quantum states stay indistinguishable. We state conjectures on removing the restriction on superposition queries.

Source: arXiv:2609.11901v1 - http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11901v1 PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2609.11901v1 Original Link: http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.11901v1