Quantum-safe IPsec in the banking industry

The emergence of Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQCs) presents a critical threat to classical cryptographic systems, particularly widely adopted protocols such as RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH), and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). Given their extensive use in the financial sector, the advent of quantum adversaries compels banking institutions to proactively develop and adopt quantum-safe communication mechanisms. This paper introduces a hybrid quantum-safe architecture, orchestrated via Software-Defined Networking (SDN) key distribution. The proposed framework enables the early integration of Classical Cryptography (CC), Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) within a Dynamic Multipoint Virtual Private Network (DMVPN) environment, providing highly scalable, full-mesh, site-to-site encrypted communications for enterprise networks. This is particularly relevant at a time when PQC algorithms have not yet been incorporated into finalized IPsec standards. The architecture has been validated across a five-node testbed comprising three physical nodes within a campus network in Madrid and two private-cloud nodes located in the north of Spain and Mexico. The deployment leverages a heterogeneous mix of physical and virtual devices, diverse technology providers, Discrete Variable QKD (DV-QKD) and Continuous Variable QKD (CV-QKD) implementations, and mutually incompatible key-delivery interfaces (ETSI004, ETSI014 and Cisco SKIP), demonstrating flexibility, scalability, and interoperability across environments. Through this framework, we demonstrate that quantum-safe communication in financial networks is not only technically feasible but also scalable, interoperable, and resilient. The proposed architecture establishes a robust, flexible, and future-proof foundation for secure financial communications in the era of quantum computing.

Source: arXiv:2604.12985v1 - http://arxiv.org/abs/2604.12985v1 PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2604.12985v1 Original Link: http://arxiv.org/abs/2604.12985v1