Bayesian Belief Layer for Controllable Opinion Dynamics in LLM Agents
Abstract
LLM agents in social simulation revise their opinions implicitly, in context: how open an agent is to persuasion can neither be specified nor verified, and collective outcomes inherit the model's training prior. We introduce Bayesian Chronicle Agents (BCA), a minimal belief layer separating \emph{what} an agent believes from \emph{how} it speaks. Each stance is a probability, updated by one Bayesian step per utterance heard. A single prior-strength parameter $κ$ encodes stubbornness, modeled aft...
Description / Details
LLM agents in social simulation revise their opinions implicitly, in context: how open an agent is to persuasion can neither be specified nor verified, and collective outcomes inherit the model's training prior. We introduce Bayesian Chronicle Agents (BCA), a minimal belief layer separating \emph{what} an agent believes from \emph{how} it speaks. Each stance is a probability, updated by one Bayesian step per utterance heard. A single prior-strength parameter encodes stubbornness, modeled after its role in Friedkin--Johnsen (FJ) opinion dynamics. We then sweep this parameter to yield three canonical regimes of opinion dynamics on demand (consensus, persistent disagreement, committed-minority influence), with persistent disagreement matching the FJ closed-form fixed points at --. We further show that prescribed remains recoverable after the language round-trip, with perfect rank-order recovery across all four models. Explicit belief also makes simulation auditable: the layer surfaces systematic per-model stance biases that end-to-end simulation would silently absorb.
Source: arXiv:2609.21997v1 - http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21997v1 PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2609.21997v1 Original Link: http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21997v1
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Sep 21, 2026
Artificial Intelligence
AI
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