Strategic communication of narratives: An experiment

We investigate the strategic communication of narratives under model uncertainty. The sender has private information about the true data-generating process of publicly observable data. The receiver is uncertain about how to interpret the data, but aware of the sender's incentives to strategically provide interpretations (``narratives''). We theoretically show that the size of the conflict of interest between the sender and the receiver is a crucial determinant of equilibrium communication. In particular, the stronger the sender's bias, (i) the more senders exaggerate their information and (ii) the more receivers correct the sender's action recommendations. In a laboratory experiment, we find evidence in line with both predictions, suggesting that people in complex and uncertain environments take a narrator's strategic incentives into account. Additional analyses reveal that narrative likelihood does not drive receiver behavior and that narratives are, on average, slightly persuasive only when bias is low.

Source: arXiv:2609.10074v1 - http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10074v1 PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2609.10074v1 Original Link: http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10074v1