Assessing the Operational Impact of Poisoning Attacks over Augmented 3D Point Cloud Public Datasets for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles

Poisoning attacks against public datasets lead to major concerns, such as (i) misclassification of perceived objects when the poisoned data is used for training and (ii) embedding of backdoors that may eventually be triggered later on, when specific conditions in the system apply over the learned models. Its impact over data augmentation models is unclear. While data augmentation reduces the likelihood of poisoning attack success, some valid questions remain. Is data augmentation affecting the impact of poisoning attacks? can it increase the number of poisoned samples or injected backdoors? We explore in this paper some of these questions. We assess the effects of augmenting poisoned 3D point cloud datasets and validate that poisoning is able to evade the sanitizing nature of augmentation techniques when using the concrete case of Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) techniques to exemplify the case of data augmentation processing. We also validate that poisoning propagates over the augmented datasets and perturbs the decision made by general-purpose classifiers, in the end. All the experimental material (including tools, datasets, and classifiers) is publicly available, to facilitate reproducibility and to foster further research in the topic.

Source: arXiv:2607.06484v1 - http://arxiv.org/abs/2607.06484v1 PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.06484v1 Original Link: http://arxiv.org/abs/2607.06484v1