Quantum Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Quantum Information Structures in Games

Bergemann and Morris (2016) show that one information structure is more informative than another exactly when it induces a smaller set of Bayes correlated equilibrium outcomes in every game. We build the quantum analogue. An information structure becomes a family of density operators indexed by the payoff state, which the mediator observes. We show that obedience is equivalent to a Loewner domination between operators on one player's subsystem. The equilibrium set is then a nonempty compact spectrahedron computable by semidefinite programming, classical structures embed exactly, and under quantum individual sufficiency more information shrinks the equilibrium set in every game.

Source: arXiv:2608.04973v1 - http://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04973v1 PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.04973v1 Original Link: http://arxiv.org/abs/2608.04973v1