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Research PaperResearchia:202607.24015

Themis Consensus Extension v1: MEV Mitigation by Randomized Delayed Execution and Intent-Hiding Transactions in Application-Specific Blockchains

Shoeb Siddiqui

Abstract

Maximal extractable value (MEV) arises when privileged participants select, exclude, insert, or reorder pending transactions for private gain. We specify and analyze the Themis Consensus Extension v1, first published by Mangata in 2021. The design separates value extraction by reordering (VER) from value extraction by denial (VED). For VER, block construction and execution occur across consecutive producers: one producer commits a transaction set, and the next derives a publicly verifiable, dete...

Submitted: July 24, 2026Subjects: Cybersecurity; Computer Science

Description / Details

Maximal extractable value (MEV) arises when privileged participants select, exclude, insert, or reorder pending transactions for private gain. We specify and analyze the Themis Consensus Extension v1, first published by Mangata in 2021. The design separates value extraction by reordering (VER) from value extraction by denial (VED). For VER, block construction and execution occur across consecutive producers: one producer commits a transaction set, and the next derives a publicly verifiable, deterministic, previously un- predictable seed and executes a seed-determined, dependency-preserving permutation. For selective VED, a user may encrypt a transaction for a designated builder and executor. The builder removes an outer layer and commits the opaque inner ciphertext; the executor reveals and executes the plaintext only after commitment. Under selfish but non-colluding validators, an adversary below the underlying consensus fault threshold, secure cryptography, and accountable role performance, the construction limits unilateral post-commit ordering control and hides transaction intent from relays and the builder. It does not provide send-order or receive-order fairness, complete censorship resistance, resistance to builder-executor collusion, or per-transaction price guarantees. We analyze probabilistic extraction, spam, dependent transactions, decryption liveness, session boundaries, total denial, and threshold coalitions. We also document the initial Aura-based Substrate implementation and its subsequent transition to a BABE-based sr25519/VRF seed path, together with delayed execution, Fisher-Yates shuffling, and Xoshiro256++. The result preserves the original proposal while narrowing its claims to explicit assumptions.


Source: arXiv:2607.21406v1 - http://arxiv.org/abs/2607.21406v1 PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.21406v1 Original Link: http://arxiv.org/abs/2607.21406v1

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Submission Info
Date:
Jul 24, 2026
Topic:
Computer Science
Area:
Cybersecurity
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Themis Consensus Extension v1: MEV Mitigation by Randomized Delayed Execution and Intent-Hiding Transactions in Application-Specific Blockchains | Researchia